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THE CHANGING U.S. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
by Murray Weidenbaum
The American economy is at a turning point. After enjoying the longest peacetime
expansion in American history, we are now sliding into recession. Some perspective is
necessary.
It is easy, perhaps too easy, to blame the recession in the American economy on the

sharp run-up in oil prices brought about by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. True, the rise in oil
prices from $18 a barrel to approximately $40 is the equivalent of a large OPEC tax on the
American economy. That is so because we now import about one-half of our total oil supply.
This "tax increase" is clearly an economic depressant, pulling billions of dollars of
purchasing power out of the national economy. But it could only tip us into recession because
we were already so close to that condition just before the invasion of Kuwait in early August.

Sliding Into Recession
Let us recall the business outlook during late July 1990. The expansion was rapidly
losing steam. Three major capital-intensive sectors-automobiles, construction, and
defense-were turning down simultaneously. Large inventories of unsold
automobiles had resulted in cutbacks in production in the bellwether motor vehicle industry.
The delayed impact of tighter monetary policy in 1989 and early 1990 reenforced the
lingering effects of the 1986 tax reforms which reduced or eliminated many special incentives
or "shelters" to real estate investment. The result was to bring down housing and office
· construction to very low levels. Housing starts in July fell for the sixth consecutive month;
they fell again in August.
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On top of the declines in these two key capital-intensive civilian industries, major
defense contractors had begun to lay off substantial numbers of employees in response to
reductions in the military budget. Many of the large and medium-size firms in the military
market were also announcing future reductions in their work forces.
As a result of these three negative forces-the unusual coincidence of simultaneous
declines in autos, housing, and defense--veteran forecasters in July were reevaluating their
projections. Several of them had already concluded that the recovery phase of the business
cycle was drawing to a close.
The uncertainties in the Middle East, generally, and in the world oil market,
specifically, reenforced the negative outlook in the domestic economy in the weeks that
followed the invasion of Kuwait. The University of Michigan's index of consumer expectations
fell from 77 in July to 63 in August.
In other times, we might have expected the Federal Reserve (Fed) to offset the negative
developments in the economy by shifting to an easier monetary policy. However, the large
increases in oil prices had a double whammy on the U.S. economy, simultaneously depressing
demand and raising costs. While these price increases work their way through the industrial
system, the Fed is understandably reluctant to expand the money supply to any significant
degree. Alan Greenspan and his colleagues are sitting on the fence.
The sharp upward spurt in the estimated federal budget deficit for the next several
years, brought about in part by the ever more costly bailout of the S&Ls, immobilizes fiscal
policy as a potential source of additional stimulus. Thus, the recessionary forces have been
allowed to build up steam.
The Federal Reserve can follow its current course of action (you may call it inaction)
because the likelihood is that the recession will not last much beyond a very limited period of 69 months. Nor do we face the escalating double-digit inflation of the early 1980s. The
prospect is for inflation to be contained in the 5-6 percent price range. That gives the Fed the
confidence that they could responsibly increase the growth of the money supply should the
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economy weaken more than is now anticipated.
Should the embargo of Iraq continue without military hostilities, the pace of inflation in
the United States likely would decline after the initial run-up in oil prices was fully reflected in
the chain of production. If Iraq abandons its capture of Kuwait (either with or without external
military intervention), the change will be more dramatic.
In either event, the Fed could shift to a more expansive posture and the basis for the
next upturn in the American economy would be set in place. If the embargo continues, the
upturn likely will be moderate. In contrast, a successful conclusion to the Middle East crisis
would bolster business and consumer confidence substantially and thus contribute to a stronger
economic expansion. An extended shooting war would force forecasters (including this intrepid
economist) back to the drawing board!

The Political Economy
It has become fashionable in the last few weeks to berate both Congress and the White
House for the budget fiasco. Few profiles in courage will be etched by the historians of fiscal
policy. Indeed, there is enough blame to go around, covering both ends of Pennsylvania
Avenue and both sides of the political aisle.
But we should not overlook the accomplishments of American economic policy over the
past decade-and there are enough kudos to go around also. Since the beginning of 1981:
1. Escalating double digit inflation has been eliminated.
2. More new jobs have been created (17 million) than in Western Europe and Japan put
together.
3. We have enjoyed a greater degree of labor peace-fewer strikes and fewer people on
strike-than at any other time since the Department of Labor started collecting the
dMa.
·
4. Income tax rates have been cut across the board. The indefensible 70 percent top
rate has been eliminated. We now realize that, albeit indirectly, those punitive rates
only led to numerous tax loopholes.
5. Burdensome government regulation has been streamlined with the introduction of
benefit/cost reviews.
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Perhaps the most significant result did not occur in the United States at-all. I am
referring to the positive "demonstration effect" overseas that resulted from our efforts to reduce
the heavy hand of government. Witness the simultaneous spread of free-market economies in
various parts of the globe, in both Western and Eastern Europe.
Here at home, a new sense of realism is evident in business and personal decision
making. Labor and management have both become more cost conscious. They are even aware
of the awesome term "productivity" in a society in which government does not come so readily
to rescue the losers in the marketplace.
Congress hasn't outlawed recessions. It couldn't do so even if that volatile body could
reach agreement on such a benign objective. Nevertheless, short-term problems should not
cloud our bright long-term future. The newly liberated nations of Eastern Europe do not look
to Japan or Western Europe as their ideal. According to their own testimony, their role model
is the United States. We must be doing something right.

